In this article, the author examines the interrelationship between the various versions of Yondae Jaeyu Lok 燕臺再游録, Yu Deukgong's 柳得恭 account of the Korean tributary mission to Beijing in 1778, in order to clarify problems in the text of its only printed edition, which was included in the series Liaohai Shushe 遼海叢書 compiled by the Chinese historian Jin Yufu 金毓黻. Although Yondae Jaeyu Lok is widely familiar to historians owing to its inclusion in Liaohai Shushe and thus has been utilized by many of them, there are obvious problems due to the Liaohai Shushe edition's inordinately large number of ideographic errors and missing characters.Jin Yufu published Liaohai Shushe while he was working in Manchukuo as the assistant director of the National Fengtian Library 国立奉天図書館. The series edition of Yondae Jaeyu Lok was based on an abridged manuscript given to Jin by Korean Buddhist scholar Kwon Sangro 権相老. The author's comparison of the text of the Liaohai Shushe edition with the other extant manuscripts of Yondae Jaeyu Lok, including a manuscript written by Yu Deukgong himself, shows a close relationship between the Liaohai Shushe edition and the manuscript preserved at National Taiwan Normal University, due to their common ideographic errors, missing characters, and character phrases in reverse order. Due to the fact that the National Taiwan Normal University manuscript bears the bookplate of a person to whom Jin Yufu temporarily entrusted his book collection in order to protect it from harm during the war, it is highly probable that this manuscript is the one which Jin Yufu utilized in compiling Liaohai Shushe.Characteristics peculiar to the text of the Liaohai Shushe edition include 1) Japan being referred to with the characters 日本, in contrast to 倭 (implying subservience) in the other manuscripts and 2) lacking the section containing dialogue referring to the subordination of the Kingdom of Ryukyu to Japan. The author is the opinion that such alterations in terminology and abridgements stemmed in the case of 1) from Jin Yufu's position as the assistant director of the National Fengtian University Library, a status necessitating sensitivity towards Japanese interests, and in the case of 2), Jin Yufu's judgment of the passage as too controversial in light of the traditional Chinese assertion of its historical suzerainty over Ryukyu.

This article examines according to what information and for what reasons Japan attempted to set up a system for capturing suspicious foreign ships shipwrecked in Korean waters and the manner in which Joseon, which accepted the arrangement, implemented those transfer requests and disposed of the ships, within the context of its relations with Qing China and Japan. After its prohibition of Christianity and in the aftermath of the Jesuit Infiltration Plots of 1642 and 43, Japan requested that in the case of any suspicious ships adrift in Korean waters, Joseon divert them to Japan House (J: Wakan/K: Waegwan 倭館) in Pusan for transfer to Japan. From testimony given by Jesuit missionaries apprehended in the Infiltration Plots, the Japanese authorities were cognizant of the possibility that more missionaries would launch similar attempts from Korean shores and were thus on the alert. In order to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, Joseon accepted Japan's request, replying that it would divert all suspicious vessels to Japan House. The ships of Ming Dynasty subjects were frequently cast adrift upon Korean shores, and in the midst of the transition from the Ming to the Qing Dynasty, Joseon as a tributary of Qing was obligated to return Ming subjects to the Qing authorities, which opened the possibility that those people would be executed upon their arrival in Qing China. Upon the shipwreck of a Ming vessel in 1644, Joseon, which was thankful to the Ming Dynasty for defending her from Japanese invasion and felt obligated to help Ming subjects, tried to save the survivors by sending them to Japan under the pretense that they were possible Christian adherents. Pleased with Joseon's response, Japan requested that any suspicious ships adrift in Korean waters would continue to be diverted to Japan House. However, when the next Ming shipwreck occurred, a Qing Dynasty envoy happened to be visting Joseon, making it, impossible to transfer survivors to Japan without drawing the attention of the Qing envoy. On that occasion Joseon King Injo decided to confer with the envoy about how to deal with Ming survivors. Although the consultation did not take place due to the surrender of the Ming subjects to Qing authorities, Qing Dynasty, wary of the military alliance formed between the Ming Dynasty and Japan, forbade Joseon from sending Ming subjects to Japan. At the same time, Joseon reported to the Qing Dynasty the fact of Japan's request for the diversion of suspicious ships, as well as the dispatch of Ming envoys to Japan in search of military assistance, emphasizing a Japanese threat to Qing security, all in the hope of gaining such concessions as exemptions from Qing-imposed rice and maritime corvee duties, the lifting of prohibitions on the building and repair of military fortifications and the resumption of army training. Although Joseon's plan was initially successful, upon the enthronement of Joseon King Hyojong, Qing China reprimanded Joseon for citing a Japanese threat as an excuse for remilitarization. Consequently, fearing the anger of Qing China, Joseon proceeded to return all shipwrecked Ming subjects (with some exceptions) to the Qing authorities. Nevertheless, the debate continued within Joseon on the strength of strong anti-Qing sentiment as to whether or not to send shipwrecked Ming subjects to Japan as suspected Christian adherents.

It has been the conventional opinion of historians studying with both China and Siam that although Ayutthaya, being a kingdom of Southeast Asia lying outside the Chinese linguistic and Confucian ideological sphere, had, nevertheless, been designated as a Vassal of the Ming, the relationship was different from the political order involving the Suzerain-Vassal relationships of East Asia. It is said that Ayutthaya became a vassal is because the Ming Dynasty limited foreign trade to the countries which they vassalized. However, a passage in Ming Shilu 明実録 describing how the Siamese ambassador offered the Ming Dynasty to deploy troops in the campaign to defeat Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea would seem to cast doubt on the conventional wisdom. While this incident has drawn attention from Siam historians as one achievement of Naresuan, the liberator of Ayutthaya from Burma, it has not yet to be studied from the viewpoint of Chinese history. The aim of this article is to investigate the events surrounding the promise to deploy Siamese troops in the Wangli 万暦 Korean Campaign, in order to clarify political relations between Ayutthaya and the Ming Dynasty at that time.To begin with, the author shows that 1) the assertion that it was Naresuan who suggested the deployment is untenable and 2) the offer was not a spontaneous response on the part of the Siamese, but rather part of a plan engineered by the Chinese Minister of War, Shi Xing 石星. Next, the author turns to the backdrop against which Shi Xing planned to employ Siamese military resources, showing that Ayutthaya was not trusted as a Chinese vassal and that such contemporaries as Xiao Yuan 蕭彦, The Censor-in-Chief and Supreme commander of Liangguang provinces (総督両広都御史), as well as Yu Shenhang 于恨行, the former Minister of Rites, opposed to the Deployment of Siamese troops.While it is true that until the Wangli Era (1573-1620), though Ayutthaya had been a vassal, the Ming Dynasty regarded little importance, that relationship would change within a dynamic milieu characterized by Burma's annexation of Ayutthaya and a weakening of the Ming Dynasty. As Ayutthaya rendered tribute and strengthened its independence from Burma by Ming making the state seal again which had been lost in battle, the Ming Dynasty welcomed Ayutthaya for the sake of bolstering its failing international order and attempted to employ Siamese military resources against threats posed to that order by pirates, Burma and Japan. From the Ming standpoint within its declining political power and changes occurring in the international environment, Ayutthaya suddenly increased its importance, even if only in a formal manner, as an adherent to the old order and a vassal willing to provide military cooperation. Here we can observe a period of transition in which an evolution in international relations was occurring that cannot be understood by mere schematic methods of interpretation.